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Abstract— We present quantitative considerations for the 
design of redundancy and diversity in embedded systems with 
security requirements. The potential for malicious activity against 
these systems have complicated requirements and design choices. 
New design trade-offs have arisen besides those already familiar 
in this area: for instance, adding redundancy may increase the 
attack surface of a system and thus increase overall risk. Our case 
study concerns protecting redundant communications between a 
control system and its controlled physical system. We study the 
effects of using: (i) different encryption keys on replicated 
channels, and (ii) diverse encryption schemes and 
implementations. We consider two attack scenarios, with 
adversaries having access to (i) ways of reducing the search space 
in attacks using random searches for keys; or (ii) hidden major 
flaws in some crypto algorithm or implementation. Trade-offs 
between the requirements of integrity and confidentiality are 
found, but not in all cases. Simple models give useful design 
insights. In this system, we find that key diversity improves 
integrity without impairing confidentiality – no trade-offs arise 
between the two – and it can substantially increase adversary 
effort, but it will not remedy substantial weaknesses of the crypto 
system. Implementation diversity does involve design trade-offs 
between integrity and confidentiality, which we analyse, but turns 
out to be generally desirable for highly critical applications of the 
control system considered. 
Keywords— security assessment; safety assessment, safety vs. 
security trade-offs; adversary effort; embedded systems; software 
and hardware diversity  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Security in embedded system is an important concern, 
highlighted by successful attacks on safety-critical systems and 
national infrastructures and by widely voiced concerns about 
widespread vulnerabilities. We address the design decisions and 
trade-offs arising when using diverse, redundant components to 
address safety and security concerns.  
In critical embedded systems, it is common to apply, for 
reliability and for safety [1], [2]:  
• redundancy: using more than one functional modules 
(achieving the same system goals), to improve the likelihood 
that the function is performed correctly, or avoids unsafe 
failures; 
• diversity: intentional differences between redundant 
components, to reduce the likelihood of common failures 
due to systematic causes that would reduce the benefit of 
redundancy. 
Redundancy and diversity are also useful for security, e.g. 
via redundant defences (viz. diverse antivirus software or 
firewalls), or redundant assets (viz. multiple diverse servers for 
availability); a designer has to anticipate their effects with 
respect to all faults, accidental or malicious, and any design 
trade-offs arising.  
In addressing security concerns, we have often heard 
objections to probabilistic methods, on the basis that security 
deals with unpredictable, intentional human action. The 
argument for using probabilities ([3], [4]) can be summarized as: 
quantitative probabilistic reasoning is a means for reasoning 
rationally in the presence of uncertainty, although there is no 
claim that it eliminates it. This paper is an example of this use.  
This paper addresses design decisions about the redundancy 
and degree of diversity in a redundant architecture, in view of 
the possible need of trade-offs between competing requirements. 
We use a simple example, generalizing from a concrete 
industrial case study [5]: a controller for an electro-mechanical 
system, implemented as three parallel channels with 2-out-of-3 
voting: if any one out of three channels fails, the others can 
continue delivering correct control, or trigger a transition to a 
fail-safe state (what is “fail-safe’ depends on the controlled 
mechanical load). 
For a safety requirement like “no hazardous condition shall 
be caused by this controller”, the chances of it being satisfied 
during operation depend on the probability of two or more 
channels failing together so as to cause dangerous control inputs, 
due to any combination of malicious or accidental causes. 
In this kind of systems, the security concern is usually 
“security for safety”: an adversary may produce an accident, or 
make it more likely and the designers’ concern is to make this 
less likely. In security terminology, this creates integrity 
requirements (we want the adversary not to be able to cause 
these failures). Through violations of integrity, an adversary 
may cause accidents: directly, at a time of his choosing, by 
making a majority of channels agree on an unsafe action; or 
indirectly, by making one or more of the channels unable to react 
properly when another channel fails accidentally, making the 
system effectively non-redundant and thus less safe than is 
required: a delayed-effect, “stealthy” attack. Adversaries may 
also be interested in less severe forms of sabotage, to reduce the 
availability or efficiency of the system, e.g. perturbing the 
control algorithms so as to increase energy consumption, wear-
and-tear, stress on operators/users, etc. 
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So far, introducing security considerations has not changed 
the characterization of this system as a 2-out-of-3 system: it only 
fails if two or more channels fail, for any reason. The adversary’s 
goal for an integrity violation is to emulate carefully chosen 
failures for two out of three channels. However, any embedded 
system may also have confidentiality requirements. That is, the 
three channels process some information such that it becoming 
known to an adversary would be a loss, despite not having direct 
effect on data/system integrity. Confidentiality requirements 
may arise for instance: 
• independently of the safety requirements for the individual 
system compromised, e.g. being aimed at safeguarding 
intellectual property in a channel’s software, or in the 
controlled system (e.g., sensor data may reveal design 
details); 
• or from safety concerns, indirectly: e.g., by reading I/O data, 
the adversary might devise better attacks (“cyber” attacks or 
physical attacks), on the same or even on different 
applications of the same control system. In other systems, 
attackers may gain access to code which will, similarly, 
facilitate other attacks. 
Importantly, if the confidential information can be obtained 
through any channel, then our example system behaves – from 
the confidentiality viewpoint – as a “series” or “3 out of 3” 
system: compromising one channel compromises the whole. 
Adding more redundant channels (identical or diverse) would 
decrease risk due to accidental faults, but typically increase risk 
of violation of confidentiality. Trade-offs would arise between 
confidentiality and safety and between direct and indirect safety 
risk. The optimum degree of redundancy depends on the 
combination of the adversary’s strategy and the particular loss 
function that associates losses to the various loss events. 
The example that motivates this study arose in project 
SeSaMo (http://sesamo-project.eu/), [5] which studied synergies 
and trade-offs between security and safety in embedded systems. 
The problem is how to protect redundant communication 
channels, in an embedded system, between a controlled 
apparatus and its feed-back controller. Redundant 
communication channels bring sensor readings to the controller 
and bring control inputs back from it. Attackers might gain 
access (read and/or write) to these communication channels; so 
the messages are encrypted to prevent the attacker discovering 
their contents or injecting forged messages (forged control 
commands, or forged sensor readings, causing the controller to 
issue inappropriate commands), so as to cause harm to the 
controlled system. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section II 
introduces our case study; section III describes the attack 
scenarios and modelling assumptions; section IV analyses our 
triple-modular redundant system under a cryptanalysis attack, in 
which the adversary systematically explores a search space for 
the key used in each channel; section V describes a similar 
analysis for the case in which some of the crypto components 
used in the implementation contain serious flaws known to the 
adversary  (we call this scenario “supply chain” attack); section 
VI discusses our results in the light of other research work; 
section VII presents conclusions and discusses generalizations 
and further work.   
II. CASE STUDY 
Our case study is a motion control system: an electric motor, 
driven by solid-state inverters, and a Controller which controls 
the latter to achieve the motion required (continuous, variable 
speed, rotations of a mechanical load from a position to another, 
etc).  
The angular position of the motor is sensed by triple sensors 
and their readings sent to the Controller, which uses them to 
calculate the control inputs for the power electronic components 
which drive the motor. All signals are replicated for reliability 
and encrypted for security. Fig 1 shows this for the direction 
from the motor to the controller.  
 
Fig. 1. A motion control system: a high level overview of the components in 
the Motor Assembly and the Controller Assembly. We only show the 
triplication of the sensor values and encryption/decryption followed by voting 
before an adjudicated value goes to the controller (i.e. upwards in the figure 
above from Motor Assembly to Controller Assembly). Triplication of control 
messages, encryption/decryption and voting also happens with the “control 
command” that comes out of the controller and goes to the motor assembly (i.e. 
downwards in the figure) – we omit it from the figure for the sake of readability. 
Other components like the Voter and the Controller can also be replicated for 
reliability, but this does not affect security in our attack scenario: therefore it is 
not shown in the figure.    
For our purposes, this system is composed of these 
subsystems: 
1. the Motor Assembly containing the motor and power 
electronics; the components for receiving, decrypting and 
voting the control inputs; the sensors, and the components 
(including encryption components) for transmitting their 
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readings. A hardware-generated synchronization signal 
triggers periodic transmission of sensor readings; 
2. the Controller Assembly with components performing: 
decryption of sensor readings; voting on them, to give a 
single sensor input to the controller; the control function 
proper, which calculates control signals; the encryption and 
transmission of the latter. The controller assembly is a 
standard subsystem that can be connected to a variety of 
motors with their mechanical loads;  
3. the communication channels between the two subsystems 
above.  
Our problem is the attack interface provided by the 
communication media. The Motor assembly and Controller 
assembly are positioned at some distance from each other, so 
that adversaries are interested in intercepting and/or forging 
messages in the communication channel between the two. In our 
example this could be several meters of communication cables, 
on which the adversary could briefly install taps to intercept 
messages and again at a later time to inject forged messages. In 
other embedded systems the communication channels could be 
e.g. buses or wireless channels, each varying the opportunities 
and problems for the attackers in reading or injecting messages. 
The encryption on the messages is thus the obstacle that the 
attacker has to overcome. Encryption is organised as follows (we 
use sensor reading messages in channel A as an example): 
• from the motor assembly unit, sensor A’s readings are to be 
sent to the controller assembly through a dedicated 
communication channel (wire A), after encryption; 
• the Sensor A reading and Sensor A ID together with protocol 
information (such as a sequence number and checksum) 
form a message; this is encrypted via a symmetric-key 
algorithm with key KA to produce an encrypted message; 
• the encrypted message is sent over wire A to the Controller 
Assembly; 
• when received by the Controller Assembly, the message is 
decrypted using the same symmetric key KA. Authenticity is 
checked; design options for this include to consider the 
message authentic if the decryption produces a legal 
plaintext (recognizable by e.g. including in the plaintext an 
error detection code); or to also send a cryptographic hash 
for authentication.  For the sake of brevity, we only analyse 
the former option: if decryption succeeds (it reveals a correct 
checksum), then the message is considered authenticated; 
• the three keys KA, KB and KC may be different. In principle, 
the system designer may decide to use for the three channels 
the same key or different keys; and to use the same or 
different encryption algorithms. For simplicity, we will 
assume in either case the same key length for all channels. 
                                                          
1  Modelling this scenario also gives us a general model for all attacks that 
rely on systematic search of a space for a “winning” element, with the 
same probability for all elements. 
This system exhibits some security concerns present in many 
embedded systems: 
• the electronics are intended to be long-lived: both the 
encryption algorithms and their keys are hardwired and will 
not change over the many years of operation of an installed 
system. Thus: 
• a patient adversary can intercept a sequence of 
messages from a system controlling a high-value 
item of machinery and then spend as long as needed 
(perhaps months, perhaps five or ten years) 
performing offline cryptanalysis, to discover keys 
so as to perform an attack; 
• in particular, the longer an encryption algorithm (or 
a specific implementation) is in use, the more likely 
it is that vulnerabilities/weaknesses will be 
found/published for it: security risk may increase  
dramatically  over a system’s lifetime. With 
increasing openness of embedded systems to a 
dynamic environment, there are pressures to make 
embedded systems easy to update/patch, but this 
also brings drawbacks so that purely static 
embedded systems are, for the time being, an 
important scenario for security analysis; 
• additionally, keeping design details secret is not a viable 
option. Message formats will be in the documentation of the 
off-the-shelf components that compose the system. The 
plaintext of the message will for some installations have 
known ranges of possible values (e.g., the angle of rotation 
of a given machine driven by an instance of this system). For 
design details that cannot be obtained from published 
documentation, attackers may have the option of buying an 
instance of the control system to study in their own lab. 
III. ATTACK SCENARIOS, MEANS AND GOALS; MODELLING 
ASSUMPTIONS 
We consider two possible means of attacks on security of the 
communication channels: 
• “Cryptanalysis” by search of a reduced key space. We 
assume here the simplest form of cryptanalysis: random 
search of a key space, so that the probability of finding the 
key increases linearly with the effort. Current symmetric 
encryption methods with sufficient key length, like AES, are 
considered unbreakable by brute force in feasible amounts of 
time. But a reasonable concern, given the history of 
cryptography, is that an adversary may become able to 
substantially reduce the key space to search, e.g. by knowing 
the algorithm by which the vendor chooses the encryption 
keys, or other implementation flaws1. In this scenario, the 
adversary intercepts some messages containing sensor 
readings and attempts to discover the encryption keys used. 
To this end he will exploit flaws in physical security, e.g. 
access to the area during normal operation to install and 
remove taps, corrupt maintenance staff to record messages 
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while performing diagnostics, etc. Bus-based or wireless 
communication may offer other opportunities. 
The adversary needs to listen on communication lines just 
long enough to collect messages to use in the cryptanalysis 
effort; in the limiting case just one message.  
• “Supply chain” attacks: exploiting fatal vulnerabilities in 
the encryption, that allow very low-effort attacks, and are 
known to the attackers but not to the system designers. A 
common concern is a “corrupted” supply chain, through 
which vulnerabilities were intentionally inserted for later 
exploitation. Some scenarios are: an intentional flaw in the 
implementation of the encryption; keys extracted from a 
reduced key space, so that an adversary who knows this 
restricted set can apply random search attacks with a chance 
of success at affordable cost; or, the key associated with a 
specific instance of a component is directly leaked to the 
adversary. Similar effects would happen if unintended 
vulnerabilities, poor choice of keys, secret lists of keys are 
discovered by, or sold to, the adversary.  
We consider two possible goals for attacks: 
• “confidentiality” breach: discovering the key for one 
communication channel, so as to decipher the sequence of 
messages in it; 
• “integrity” breach: discovering the keys for a majority of 
channels (2 out of 3, in our case) so gaining the ability to 
forge messages that will cause erroneous and possibly 
dangerous control signals at the output of the voter in the 
Motor Assembly; or that will cause erroneous sensor 
readings at the outputs of the voter in the Controller 
Assembly, so that these false readings deceive the controller 
into issuing dangerous control signals. 
We do not consider an adversary who only aims at causing 
unavailability by jamming the communication channels, which 
the assumed ability for physical access makes easy, but would 
be easy to detect and counteract. Likewise, we do not consider 
attacks in which the adversary, having breached security on only 
one channel, injects erroneous messages in that channel, as a 
"stealth" attack on integrity that would cause a majority of 
erroneous signals the next time that one of the non-compromised 
channels fails. Again, such an attack would likely be quickly 
detected by usual sanity checks on message values, and thus fail 
by triggering a maintenance intervention and the discovery of 
the intrusion. 
Once an adversary acquires ways of injecting forged 
messages, whether and when he will exploit this capability to 
cause harm depends on his intentions and circumstances. 
The parameter of interest for the system designer will be the 
probability of the attacker having or acquiring this capability if 
he pursues it. We will thus study this probability. This is 
consistent with the common practice in safety analysis of 
assessing and containing the probability of hazard conditions 
rather than that of accidents. The time at which an adversary may 
decide to pursue these capabilities, or, after acquiring them, to 
                                                          
2 An alternative assumption is that the only probabilistic dependence 
between keys assigned to the channels is that they must be different. The 
strike, will instead be of interest during operation and a matter 
of intelligence about the attackers' intentions, resources and 
strategies. 
We study the security effects of design choices as a function 
of model parameters, as though these parameters are known, 
thus leaving the problem of parameter estimation as a separate 
problem. This divide-and-conquer approach gives useful insight 
to designers (as experience with design for reliability and safety 
shows), though to yield design decision it also requires some 
assumptions about, or estimation of, model parameters.   
IV.CRYPTANALYSIS ATTACKS VIA RANDOM SEARCH, AND 
DEFENCE BY KEY DIVERSITY 
We study the amount of "adversary effort" required, an 
analogue of the "time to failure" in reliability. One can translate 
"adversary effort" into time via assumptions about the 
intentions, resources and capabilities of the adversaries; but this 
translation is often unnecessary for the purpose of just 
discovering design trade-offs and even for optimizing design. 
We are interested in how redundancy or diversity change the 
effort needed for the adversary to achieve a certain probability 
of success. Our measure of effort will be the number t of 
attempts, that is, of possible key values that the attacker tries out. 
Increasing this required effort is the designer’s goal, both for 
reducing the probability of an attacker succeeding and for 
deterring attacks, or causing an attacker to give up and move to 
a different target. Even in these days of high-performance 
distributed cryptanalysis with cheap computing resources, an 
adversary needs to decide whether spending, or continuing to 
spend, resources against a certain target is promising enough to 
be a wise choice, in comparison with alternative uses of the 
resources. 
We call Texh the number of attempts required for an 
exhaustive search (i.e. the size of the keyspace subset to search), 
and we consider the probability of an attacker achieving a goal 
(discovery of one, or two, or three channel keys) as a function of 
the number of attempts t. Assuming that the keys are allocated 
to channels by choosing randomly and independently from the 
whole keyspace (as is reasonable)2, the event “the r-th key tried 
by the attacker is the right key for channel i” is independent of 
any event of the same form affecting other channels. This set of 
independence properties underlies the following results. Last, 
for notational convenience we define a measure of “normalized 
effort”,	 = . 
The adversary may choose to attempt decryption of one, two 
or three channels in parallel (that is, spreading trials of possible 
keys - the same or different ones - on messages from the three 
channels) or in sequentially (dedicating all the effort to one 
channel first, and only after success on that one moving on, if 
desired, to the next channel). 
effect on the results presented here is numerically negligible, unless the 
keyspace is minuscule. 
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The sequential attack is the more efficient process for the 
attacker3 (see Appendix). With this form of attack: 
• as a baseline, we observe that with just one channel, the 
probability of success is  	
 =  =  ; 
• with three channels sharing a single key the probability of 
success (giving the ability to read and/or forge messages on 
any number of channels) is still 	
 =  =  ; 
• with three different keys, the probability of finding one key 
is still 	
 =  =  (since it turns out that the best attack 
strategy is to concentrate effort on one channel). 
Redundancy and diversity do not increase the risk to 
confidentiality4; 
• from the viewpoint of integrity (breaking two out of the three 
keys), the expression Q2 for the probability of success is 
more complex but is plotted in Fig 2. For t such that 1<<t< 
Texh , 	 = (
)	≈


(τ)2: using diverse keys reduces the 
adversary‘s probability of success by a factor 

  = 

; 
•  in other words, it reduces this probability from a value Q1 to 
Q2 = ()

  . 
If, instead, the adversary chose the “parallel”, sub-optimal 
strategy of attack, his best option would be to split the effort 
equally over the three channels, giving probability of success 
τ2 
- 

τ3 ≈	
τ2. Therefore the probability of success is lower by a 1/3. 
An alternative description is in terms of adversary effort 
required to achieve a certain probability of success. The effort 
required for assured decryption of m keys is of course m Texh, so, 
using diverse keys doubles the adversary’s effort for an integrity 
breach on the 2-out-of-3 system (that is, for finding two keys).  
However, an adversary may well consider worthwhile an attack 
that gives a non-negligible probability of success, say 10% or 
20%; or even much less. Fig 2 shows that the lower the 
probability of success that the adversary considers sufficient to 
justify attacks (which often also means “the higher the value of 
the target”, making these moderate-probability attacks important 
for the defender – e.g. leading to severe, though low-probability, 
accidents), the more advantage diversity of keys will give to the 
defence. 
A useful measure of this advantage of using different keys is 
the increase in the adversary effort required to achieve a certain 
probability of success. Fig 3 gives an example5. 
                                                          
3  We observe that this is the best strategy if the attacker has a way of 
knowing when he has found the right key, which is the case in the design 
assumed here: the plaintext contains redundant information, used by the 
legitimate recipient to verify authenticity. We have considered alternative 
designs without this property, but their discussion is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
4  From the viewpoint of cryptanalytic effort in this attack scenario. From 
other viewpoints, e.g. physical security against access that allows the 
adversary to tap signals, multiple cables may or may not increase risk, 
 
Fig. 2. Probability of success for a given effort, for finding one key, for finding 
two via the optimal strategy, and for finding two via one of the non-
optimal strategies (dividing effort equally on the three channels) that an 
adversary may follow. 
If we believe our adversary to consider worthwhile an attack 
that gives a probability of success of – say – 10%, then, using 
the fact that 	
 =  =  and the approximation Q2 ≈ 
(τ)2, we 
can observe that a probability of success that with one key is 
given by effort τ requires, with diverse keys, effort √2	: larger 
than  for any search short of a complete search of both key 
spaces. To consider which conditions favour the defender over 
the attacker, we can rewrite this expression without the 
normalization: the level of Q1 achieved in t attempts with a one-
key system requires, with two keys, 2	T. The ratio of the 
effort required for two keys vs one key is  : the smaller the 
subset of the key space that the attacker can afford to search, the 
greater (by an inverse square-root law) the effort increase 
required by the presence of diverse keys.  
Considering an attacker’s options, we see that within a wide 
range of values, the smaller the probability of success that the 
adversary considers worth an attack, the more effective key 
diversity will be in thwarting (or deterring) him. For instance, if 
an attacker considers worthwhile an attack with 20% chances of 
success, the effort required with two diverse keys will be more 
than 3 times greater than with just one key. This increases to 
almost 10 times greater if the adversary is willing to attack for a 
2% probability of success; or for 20% probability of success if 
depending on details of geometry, etc. We expect, however, that the 
degree of replication of communication channels will be dictated by 
reliability and safety requirements, and will thus be a given for the 
designers of the encryption mechanisms.  
5   These plots are calculated assuming a small key space of 1000 just for the 
sake of illustration, to plot results as a function of t, requiring an example 
value of Texh; but the curves are to all practical effect identical for any 
larger key-space.  
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the attacker needs to find five keys instead of just one key6. In 
the worst case that the adversary can afford a complete search, 
of course key diversity still makes certainty of success twice as 
expensive for two keys, or m times as expensive for m keys; 
likewise, the mean effort required for success on m keys is m 
times the mean for one key, as the sum of m identically 
distributed, independent random variables. 
Seen from the designers' viewpoint, this also means that if 
their target is a probability of integrity violation of τ, they only 
need to ensure that this probability is, for each single channel, 
√2. For instance to assure a probability of integrity violation 
under 10-6, it is sufficient to ensure a probability of violation per 
channel of 1.41 10-3. 
Conversely, however, if the adversary's probability of 
success on one channel is high, using diverse keys in the 
different communication channels only brings small advantages. 
For probabilities of success between 0.5 and 1, the effort 
required for two keys is between approximately 1.7 and 2 times 
that required for one key. In other words, a communication 
architecture that requires the adversary to find two diverse keys 
substantially strengthens cryptographic protection that is already 
reasonably strong with a single key, but adds very little strength 
if not. 
In conclusion, key diversity very effectively reduces the risk 
of integrity violations from random search through a reduced 
key space, for flaws in the encryption method implementation 
that give attacker a low but worthwhile (for the attackers) chance 
of success in such attacks. The concern is then whether flaws 
exist, unknown to the system designer, that make this probability 
of success too high for key diversity alone to be a sufficient 
defence. Then, diversity between the implementation of security 
in the redundant channels will be desirable. We discuss this 
scenario in the next section. 
                                                          
6  An architecture requiring the adversary to find several keys in order to 
succeed in an integrity attack would not need more than three physical 
communication channels. Given enough bandwidth, it could use multiple 
encrypted copies of each message, sharing the same channel. There would 
be drawbacks to avoid: identical copies would give an adversary who has 
discovered a key a known plaintext for searching other keys; while in the 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3. Adversary effort caused by diverse keys: increase in effort required to 
achieve a desired probability of (a) finding two keys vs finding one key; 
(b) finding  m = 2, 3, 4 or 5 different keys, vs finding one key. 
 
 
basic configuration we study, readings of different sensors will normally 
exhibit small random discrepancies, which make it harder for an adversary 
to exploit the fact that the readings must be physically consistent. We will 
not explore this design variation further in this paper. 
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V.“SUPPLY CHAIN” ATTACKS AND DIVERSITY 
In this scenario, the adversary exploits vulnerabilities in the 
implementation of encryption, introduced intentionally, or 
present by accident and disclosed to the adversary and not to the 
defenders, etc. The flaw may be in the implementation by a 
specific vendor. To reduce this risk, the designer of our control 
system may choose to procure more than one, diverse versions 
of the encryption components, from three different 
manufacturers, to use in the three channels. Or a flaw may be 
discovered in the cryptography algorithm itself, and secretly 
sold to the adversary. Against this risk, the designer may want 
to use different algorithms in the different channels.  
Just as in the use of diversity against accidental faults, the 
designer would try to obtain for the communication channels in 
the system “substantially different” versions of the cryptography 
function to be provided, meaning that, in addition to coming 
with good evidence of quality, they (i) are as different as 
possible, and (ii) give as good guarantees of having been 
developed independently as possible. 
This diverse procurement brings costs, e.g. in more complex 
supply chains and maintenance, creating trade-offs that are well 
known in applications of diversity for safety. The additional 
costs are justified if protecting high value targets, or large 
enough numbers of deployed systems.    
The requirements about what aspects should be different 
between diverse versions relate to the set of causes of common 
failures that one considers to require diversity as a defence 
despite other precautions [3], [6]. For instance, buying versions 
from different vendors would reduce the risk of a common flaw 
in the development cultures behind the versions, which might 
cause flaws affecting the versions themselves; in view of the fact 
that similar algorithms to be implemented, or similar structures 
of hardware or software design, may make the same kind of 
errors likely for different developers, one would like evidence 
that the algorithms and structuring of the programs are different; 
etc. Other parts of  the “implementation” of a complete crypto 
solution also matter: one would want some assurance that the 
key generation processes for different versions are not only 
apparently good but also different, reducing the likelihood of 
shared flaws; for that matter, one might require that crypto chips 
meant for different communication channels be delivered to the 
factory by different couriers using different warehouses, if there 
was a concern that chips might be “borrowed” along the way by 
the adversaries to study (for instance, by recording their 
behaviours with a set of known plaintexts) before they are 
installed in the system. 
Let us assume that n “versions” of the implementation 
(software and hardware) of an encrypted communication 
channel are available on the market. That is, our system 
designers, looking for off-the-shelf component implementing 
encryption with the key length and other general properties they 
require, can choose between n solutions that are different in all 
details required (as discussed in the previous paragraph). Out of 
these, a (generally unknown) number k contains flaws of the 
very serious (“fatal”, henceforth) type about which we are 
concerned, such that diversity of keys is not a sufficient 
protection, which are known to adversaries, or will be at a future 
time of concern. For brevity, we will talk simply of versions 
which may be flawed or correct. As the simplest scenario, we 
assume that each version is "as good as" any of the others from 
the system designer’s viewpoint: same cost, cryptographic 
strength, power consumption, etc., and same probability of 
having flaws of any given level of severity: therefore the system 
designers will choose among them randomly (without 
replacement), with equal probabilities. For a three-channel 
system, the system designer selects between one and three 
versions out of the n versions on the market. The probability of 
a randomly chosen version being flawed is   , which we call q. 
What are the probabilities of the system built being open to 
attack (“flawed”, for brevity), depending on how many versions 
the system designer decides to use?  
With a single version deployed in all three channels, the 
probability of having a flawed version (and thus three flawed 
channels) is Qsingle=q. Three identical channels are as vulnerable 
(both for confidentiality and integrity) as a single channel. 
With two versions (one version for one channel and another for 
the other two), 
• the probability of a flaw in at least  1 out of 3 channels  is the 
probability that at least 1 out of 2 versions is vulnerable: 
	!"#$%,
/ = 	2( − (
 − (*
1 −	1*
 
which for the (maybe unlikely) case of large n would be 
approximately 2q-q2; 
• the probability of a flaw in at least 2 out of 3 channels is the 
probability that the version that is chosen for two channels is 
flawed: 
	!"#$%,/=q; 
Thus using two versions increases the risk to confidentiality 
without reducing the risk to integrity. 
With three versions (one per channel), 
• the probability of a flaw in at least  1 out of 3 channels  is : 
	,-./0,1/3 = 1 − (1−()21−(−
1
*321−(−2*3
21−1*321−2*3
  
which for large n would be approximately 1-(1-q)3; 
• the probability of flaws in at least two channels would be 
	,-./0,2/3 =
( 2( − 1*3 23 − 2( − 2*3
21 − 1*3 21 − 2*3
	
 
or, for large n, approximately 3q2-2q3. 
Fig 4 plots 	456%,
/ and 	,-./0,2/3 against q. 
For k=1 (only one flawed version among the n on the 
market), diversity in a two-out-of-three configuration makes a 
system integrity flaw impossible, while it does not eliminate the 
risk of a system confidentiality flaw, which has probability  . 
8 
 
This is highlighted in Fig 4 by the points showing the two 
probabilities for n=5,  	=0.2. 
 
Fig. 4. “Supply-chain” attack: Probabilities of having a compromised system 
with a non-diverse vs a 3-version implementation, as a function of the 
probability for a single version. The continuous lines show the shape of 
the functions for n>>1. The points show an example in which the market 
offers only few (5) versions (choices of implementation).  
Compared with a single version, for ( < 0.5 using three 
diverse versions reduces the probability of integrity breach but 
increases the probability of confidentiality breach: the well 
known, common trade-off between confidentiality and integrity. 
As may be expected by analogy with 2-out-of-3 voted systems, 
with q>0.5  diversity increases risk7. 
Using diversity seems justified if it reduces the integrity risk 
by more than it adds to the confidentiality risk. If we define risk 
as the product of the probability and loss associated with an 
undesired event, this condition is written as: 
;<(	,-./0,2/3 − 	() < ;=(( − 	,-./0,1/3). 
where ;= is the expected loss from an “integrity flaw” 
(building the system with two or more “flawed” channels), ;< is 
the expected loss from a “confidentiality flaw” (building it with 
any “flawed” channel). For q close to zero (few flawed versions 
out of a large number n of available versions), this inequality 
reduces approximately (and exactly when k=1) to: 
2;> < ;? , 
The threshold may however be quite higher than 2 if a 
substantial fraction of the "each as good as the others" versions, 
                                                          
7  The curves in Fig 4 qualitatively resemble the well-known curves for a 2-
out-of-3 voted system and for a “series” system of 3 components, with the 
difference that here the k versions are sampled without replacement from 
the n available, so that e.g. channel A being flawed and channel B being 
flawed are not strictly independent events, for any finite n. So the 
available for the designers to choose from, are flawed. This is 
illustrated in  Fig 5. Since diversity is never desirable for k ≥ (n 
/ 2), the horizontal axis is truncated at q=0.5. We can see that for 
instance (rightmost round marker in the plots) if n=7 and k=3 of 
the 7 available versions are flawed, diversity is a correct risk 
reduction choice if   
;=
;<  > 8. For large values of 
@
 , the threshold 
for  
;=
;< is even higher. However, for many embedded systems the 
ratio 
;=
;< will be above the threshold, as attacks on integrity can 
directly lead to costly accidents. That is, diversity among the 
encrypted channels will usually be the preferred option, in those 
uses of this control system for which sophisticated attackers 
would be interested in sabotage. 
 
Fig. 5. Conditions under which diversity between crypto implementations in 
the three channels reduces, on balance, the risk from “supply chain” 
attacks. For this to be the case, the ratio LI / LC needs to be above the curve 
shown, for the assumed value of q (the probability that the first version 
randomly chosen from those available has fatal security flaws known to 
the adversary). 
VI.DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK 
The area of redundancy and diversity for security has been 
studied by various authors (cf e.g. an early survey and references 
[3]; a more recent one in [7]). Apart from the various proposals 
of architectures using them (usually with limited and often 
simplistic modelling; see the discussion in [3]) there is empirical 
work on the effectiveness of diversity and defence in depth with 
specific products [8], [9], [7], [10] 
distribution of the number of flawed versions in the system is 
hypergeometric. 
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Measure of adversary effort [4] have become accepted in 
very different areas [11] and are generally present in studies of 
cryptography, although it is common to report simple measures 
like mean times to success, while we study the probability of 
success as a function of effort, to derive interesting properties.  
Differently from most of these studies, we explicitly address 
the issue of driving decisions through probabilistic analysis, in a 
case in which this is feasible, on a  “what if” basis of assuming 
a threat and assessing alternative designs in view of that threat. 
This is akin to the approach often used in assessing 
cryptography.  However, our focus here has not been to analyse 
a specific cryptographic scheme and the performance of possible 
attacks on it. Rather, we assumed simple models of probability 
of success on a single key as a function of effort, and we studied 
the effects of redundant channels and diversity of keys. We used 
a linear model of probability of success for attacks on each key 
as a function of the effort spent; this can be replaced by any other 
models as required.  
While we have studied a specific case of communication in 
embedded systems, where the design parameters will be 
typically constrained by standard practice of design for safety 
and reliability in absence of attacks, we believe this is a useful 
example of how to study design trade-offs for a more general 
class of problems. 
Outside our specific case study of protecting replicated data 
paths via cryptography, many authors have considered the use 
of replication and diversity for security, in various contexts. 
Applications that have been analysed probabilistically are in 
redundant computations or data storage; researchers have been 
interested in adapting voting and quorum schemes and 
Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols to deal with security concerns. 
However, these typically assess probability of integrity violation 
(attackers being able to corrupt the result of a vote, or to avoid 
detection of corrupt behaviour by compromised copies of a 
process), and trade-offs with cost and performance overheads, 
or between reliability of voted results in the presence and in the 
absence of attacks.  A few recent examples are in [12], [13], [14], 
[15], [16]. 
On the other hand, in our experience practitioners and 
researchers routinely acknowledge the existence of integrity-
confidentiality trade-offs, but surprisingly we have not found 
formal mathematical analyses as we propose here. In the much 
more complex scenarios of replicated distributed processing or 
storage, examples of studies involving confidentiality and 
security tend to propose architectural schemes and evaluate them 
in terms of deterministic properties (e.g. of Byzantine fault 
tolerant protocols and of secret sharing methods) and study the 
performance overhead imposed by replication and fault-tolerant 
protocols, and thus performance-security trade-offs. (e.g. [17], 
[18]). 
Study of the security-reliability-safety trade-offs in the 
design of embedded systems was a main theme of the SeSaMo 
project (deliverables and project publications are at 
http://sesamo-project.eu/documents).  
From the viewpoint of the modelling assumptions and 
general results, one may wish to compare these results with those 
for redundancy and diversity against accidental faults.  
• our modelling exploits specific assumptions of independence 
between the events modelled. Undue assumptions of 
independence have been shown (by us among others) to be 
the Achilles’s heel of many probabilistic analyses about 
redundancy and diversity [19], [20]. Here, these assumptions 
are based on (1) in the cryptanalysis scenario, the keys being 
assigned independently; (2) in the “supply chain” scenario, 
the versions being chosen independently conditionally on 
previous choices (by sampling without replacement). Other 
scenarios will require more complex assumptions, which we 
have not studied yet. For instance,  
• the cryptanalysis scenario may change if the first key 
found gives useful information that reduces the effort for 
finding the next key; 
• the “supply chain” concerns apply not only to choosing 
versions that may be flawed today, but to exploring the 
probability of their being flawed, or “becoming” flawed 
(in the sense of vulnerabilities being discovered and 
made available to adversaries) a few years from now. The 
processes of creation and discovery of flaws for diverse 
versions may well be probabilistically dependent.  
• we do model a form of dependence between “failures” of the 
channels due to the fact that the adversary has a single pool 
of effort for attacks on any channel: effort spent against a 
channel A is not used for attacking channel B. By contrast, 
models of accidental failure assume that exposure to failure 
affects all the redundant channels in parallel. This explains 
why, in the special case of independence between failures of 
redundant channels, the standard expression for the 
probability of accidental failure in a 2-out-of-3 voted system 
is quadratic in the probability of failure of a single channel 
(Q2-out-of-3 ≈ 3(	B5 C%)), as ours in section IV, but with a 
larger multiplicative constant.  
• the other important difference is that for accidental failures 
the hazard rate is usually assumed constant or increasing 
slowly, for at least part of the lifetime of the system, while in 
our random search scenario the probability of successful 
breach of one channel increases linearly with effort.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
We have demonstrated some forms of probabilistic analysis 
on the security of communication in an embedded system, in 
which the time span of attacks and the time horizon for security 
assessment may range from days to decades. 
Novel aspects of this study include applying this style of 
analysis to: 
• assessing adversary effort for less-than-certain success, an 
important aspect for both attackers' and designers' decisions; 
• addressing quantitatively the trade-offs between integrity 
and confidentiality in using redundancy/diversity for 
security; 
• considering these trade-offs with respect to defence against 
the effects of unknown vulnerabilities, an extremely 
important concern which however is seldom analysed 
systematically. 
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We discuss further down how this style of analysis can be 
easily extended to many other systems, and in fact our detailed 
results already apply to other systems and scenarios that 
resemble ours from the viewpoint of the design properties we 
modelled. However, a more important conclusion is that our 
examples demonstrate how probabilistic analysis for a specific 
system can give useful answers about that system, including 
guidance for design decisions and possibly “surprises”, such as, 
in this case, revealing circumstances in which the expected 
trade-off between confidentiality and integrity does not apply 
(diversity will improve integrity without damaging 
confidentiality).  
We list some interesting observations that we derived for this 
specific design, and some ways in which they suggest more 
general insights: 
• for a cryptanalysis attack on this system, seeking to obtain 
keys by random search, the most efficient strategy for an 
adversary with a finite stock of available effort is to attack 
one channel, and only after success moving effort to another 
channel; 
• given this fact, using diverse keys on replicated 
communication channels improves integrity (in particular, 
defences against sabotage) without harming confidentiality. 
This may be a surprising finding for a designer who had not 
attempted this kind of analysis; 
• having multiple keys can substantially reduce the risk of 
integrity violation, that is, of an adversary being able to forge 
a majority of the redundant messages so as to “hijack” a 
controlled system  to do harm; 
• we note that while the degree of replication of physical 
media is dictated by reliability/cost trade-offs, it will often 
be feasible, if necessary, to decide the number of diversely 
encrypted copies of messages to be sent and voted upon 
(with perhaps more than one copy on each physical link) at 
the level desired for integrity protection; 
• if the adversary needs to spend the amount of effort t in order 
to ensure a given probability Q of a successful attack on 
integrity of a single version, then to ensure the same 
probability of successful attack against three different keys 
he or she has to spend the amount of effort √2D0Eℎ	(where 
Texh is the effort needed to penetrate the protection of a single 
channel with certainty, i.e., completing the exhaustive 
search). The difference can be large indeed, and especially 
large if adversaries are willing to attack even for small 
probabilities of success, as could be the case for high-value 
targets; 
• in the supply chain attack scenario, in which the adversary 
exploits fatal weaknesses unknown to the designer, the 
analysis confirms the intuition that diversity buys improved 
integrity at the price of weakening confidentiality, and gives 
a quantitative estimate of the overall change in risk level and 
thus a criterion to support decisions. An interesting 
observation is that the set of circumstances in which diversity 
is undesirable is broader than one would expect from the 
analogy with 2-out-of-3 redundancy against random failures; 
and yet, in the common situation in which integrity flaws 
(allowing adversaries to cause accidents) are substantially 
more dangerous than confidentiality ones, diversity is 
desirable over a large range of scenarios.   
We have modelled very basic properties of any redundant 
system subject to attacks. Thus, for instance, the law linking 
adversary effort to probability of success is characteristic of any 
situation in which the attacker explores a search space such that 
each item in it has the same probability of being the “winning” 
one, and the defender selected these independently from the 
search space. So, if the design problem concerns, for instance, 
the probability of an attacker taking control of two servers by 
random search of a space of authentication credentials (and can 
recognise when he found the right credentials, so that a 
“sequential” style of attack is optimal, as in section V), the same 
law applies. 
Just as our models are not limited to a particular kind of 
redundant component, so they are not limited to a specific 
redundant architecture. For any set of multiple channels with our 
probabilistic assumptions on the search space, the optimal 
strategy for the attacker is to attack one channel at a time 
(sequentially). So: 
• if the redundant system is a self-checking pair, the 
probability of breach in one communication channel (what 
we called probability of confidentiality breach) will also be 
the probability of an availability breach (because it allows 
the attacker to make the self-checking pair shut itself down), 
while breaking two keys will allow an integrity breach (that 
is, making the pair issue consistent incorrect outputs); 
• if the redundant system is a 1-out-of-n safety protection 
system (any one redundant protection lane has authority to 
perform safety shut-down on a plant), breach of one or two 
communication channels will allow attackers to perform a 
spurious shutdown or to reduce fault tolerance against 
accidental failures; breach of n will allow them to prevent a 
safety shutdown. 
Extensions to any number of redundant channels and of keys 
are elementary; the reduction in probability of success as a 
function of effort is of the order of τm for m keys, as shown in the 
Appendix. However, the details of architectures using more 
keys, including their reliability and safety properties, require 
further study.  
We have only analysed a very simple model of attack, but 
we see no conceptual difficulty in extending this style of analysis 
to more complex system; e.g., using separate cryptographic 
means for authentication and for confidentiality. The extension 
to attack models with different laws governing the probability of 
success as a function of effort is also conceptually simple, 
although it may be mathematically complex. For instance, we 
can consider attacks relying on the predictability of certain parts 
of the plaintext (e.g. message sequence number), or in which 
success on one key (on one channel) simplifies the process of 
attacking another key (on another channel). We plan to work on 
these aspects. 
Another direction for future work is more detailed analysis 
of our scenarios of systematic vulnerabilities in crypto systems. 
We have described, in essence, thought experiments in which 
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the availability to the attacker of reduced search opportunities 
(with given size of the reduced search space), or “fatal flaws”, is 
a parameter of the scenario and thus of the design problem. We 
believe this is a good approach for gaining insight. But for 
assessing the likely results of a design decision, and the degree 
of uncertainty about it, more complex reasoning will be required, 
in which these parameters are themselves the results of a 
probabilistic analysis of the processes that produce such 
vulnerabilities. The difficulty of inferring reasonable 
distributions of model parameters from the available knowledge 
is the foremost problem for research in security assessment, just 
as it is in important areas of reliability and safety assessment.   
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APPENDIX: PROOFS FOR CRYPTANALYSIS ATTACK 
1) Assumptions and notation 
The unit of measurement of effort is the amount of effort 
needed to check one key, assumed constant over the keys (if it 
were variable, but the sequence of keys tried is such that the 
average over a sequence much shorter than t attempts is 
approximately constant, this average can be the unit of 
measurement). The total number of keys to search is D0Eℎ, and 
the adversary has a stock of effort t. When convenient, we will 
use a normalized measure of effort, τ = . 
The keys are assumed chosen by the defender independently 
for the various channels. The adversary searches the reduced key 
space through a sequence of possible keys that is independent of 
the actual key.  
2) Optimality of sequential attack 
We call “sequential” attack the case in which the adversary 
attempts to find the key for one channel and, if he succeeds, he 
uses the remainder of his available effort for finding another key. 
The calculated probabilities of success below show that this is 
superior to the alternative of allocating fixed fractions of effort 
to attacks on three channels in the hope of finding two keys. An 
intuitive explanation follows: if after spending r1 attempts on 
channel 1, r2 on channel 2, etc., no key has been found, the 
probability of finding a key at the next attempt on channel i is 
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1/(Ti-ri): highest for the channel on which the most attempts have 
been spent. This is true even at the start, after just one 
unsuccessful attempt: to maximize the probability of success, 
one must keep trying on the same channel until successful. 
3) Sequential attack: probability of success 
The adversary attempts to find the key for one channel. 
Within the t attempts which he can perform with his stock of 
effort, he may succeeds or not. If he succeeds, (i) he has 
succeeded in a “confidentiality breach” (he can steal information 
from that channel); and (ii) if he succeed at the r-th attempt, r<t, 
he can use the effort left in his stock for (t-r) attempts to find the 
key for a second channel, seeking an “integrity breach” (that is, 
to be able to highjack the control function via a 2-out-of-3 
majority of forged messages).  
The probability of any given key being the correct one is 
1/D0Eℎ,	hence the probability 	
()	of finding the correct key for 
one channel in r attempts is:  
	
(,) = K
4
 if	0 ≤ , ≤ D1	if		, ≥ D 	 
(r≥D0Eℎ could be a realistic scenario if the adversary only has to 
search through a reduced search space, as we assume.) 
The event “two keys are found within t attempts” is the union 
of mutually exclusive events of the form “one key is found at 
attempt r and the second key is found within the remaining (t-r) 
attempts that the adversary can afford”. Thus its probability is: 
	() =∑ Q(1	R0S	TUV*W	X	X0Y.	-)	 
( − -)Z[\	(,)5]
  
When  < D	this	expression	becomes: 
	j () = ∑ 
 5 = 
(
)
	
5]
  
Note: if keys are assigned to channels by sampling without 
replacement (no two channels receive the same key), this 
beco/mes the (usually) practically identical expression: 
∑ 
 5
 = 
(
)
	(
)
5]
  
4) Generalization: sequential attack on multiple keys 
For the probability of finding s keys in t attempts, these 
expressions generalize as: 
	B() =∑ Q(1	R0S	TUV*W	X	X0Y.	-)	 B
( − -)Z[\	(,)5]
  
Which for  < D	becomes: 
	Bj() = k 
	B
( − -) =

5]

!
B!(B)!m
=
2n3 DB 
or, for keys assigned without replacement: 
2n3
(D − n)!D!  
 
5) Parallel attack 
The adversary allocates to each channel an amount of effort - ≥ 0		where	- = 1. .3, - ≤  and 1 +	2 +	3 = .	For a 
given choice of these three amounts of effort, the probabilities 
of the keys being found are, respectively for the three channels: 
1
D0Eℎ ,			
2
D0Eℎ ,			
− 
 − 
D0Eℎ . 
 
or using normalized effort: 
τ1,				τ2,				(τ− τ
 − τ) 
 
Since the events “the key is found” for each one of the three 
channels are independent, the standard analysis for a 2-out-of-3 
system with independent failures applies, as follows.  
Confidentiality breach. The probability of at least one key 
being found (probability of confidentiality breach) is: 
	,-./0,1/3 = 1 − (1 − τ1)(1 − τ2)(1 − τ + τ1 + τ2) 
a function that is maximized if two out of the three 5  are 0 and 
the third one equals τ.  
Integrity breach. The probability of at least 2 keys being 
discovered is 
	,-./0,2/3 = =2 +	=3 + 23 − 2=23                 
or after setting 3 =  − 1 − 2: 
	,-./0,2/3 = 2 + ( − 1 − 2)(1 + 2 − 212)  
 
This function reaches its maximum when 
1 = 2 = /3,  
i.e. when the adversary allocates his/her effort τ uniformly 
between the three channels, and this maximum value is: 
2
3 − 2
3
27  
or, for small , approximately 2 3⁄ . Fig 6 shows a contour 
plot of 	,-./0,2/3. 
 
Fig 6. Contour plot of the function 	,-./0,2/3  for   = 0.001. The points 
in the greyed out area are not feasible, due to the constraint: s + t ≤ .
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